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The  focus of  this  research note  is on  the  causes of  imbalanced,  if  not  indeed  lopsided, 
election  results  that  yield  dominance  within  provincial  legislatures.    Two  alternative 
areas  of  explanation  are  assessed  here.    The  first  relates  to  electoral  system  factors.  














Second,  the  flip  side  of  a  numerically  dominant  government  in  terms  of  seats  is  a  numerically  weak 
opposition and  thus a  lack of effective oversight by  said political opposition  (Carty and Stewart 1996: 
73).   This  lack of oversight occurs  in  two ways, or more precisely  in  two settings: question period and 
legislative  committees.    In  terms  of  question  period,  there  is  limited  scrutiny  since  with  a  small 
opposition  the opposition will ask  relatively  fewer questions, and government backbenchers  relatively 
more.   However, government backbenchers ask scripted “soft” questions which  lead  into an  intended 
statement  from  a  minister,  not  “real”  questions  designed  to  keep  the  government  accountable. 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on a  small number of  committees and  thus  focus  in depth on  the  issues  therein —  the United States 
Congress  being perhaps  the  ideal  type here.   Moreover,  the  threshold  for  opposition  effectiveness  in 
committees is even higher in a multi‐party system since then one needs each opposition party to be of 














The  focus of  this  research note,  though,  is on  the causes of  these  imbalanced,  if not  indeed  lopsided, 
election  results  that  yield  such  dominance  within  provincial  legislatures.  Two  alternative  areas  of 
explanation  are  assessed  here.    The  first  relates  to  electoral  system  factors.    Certainly,  the  single 
member plurality electoral system and its resulting disproportionality is a key part of the argument here.  
Yet  this  cannot  be  the  whole  story,  not  least  because  election  results  are  not  so  lopsided  in  every 





combined  with  plurality  voting.    Although  intuitive,  such  points  about  assembly  size  and  electoral 
distortion have never been thoroughly tested in a broad pan‐Canadian way.   
 
The second area of argument  relates  to  the party  system: perhaps victorious provincial parties  simply 
win a higher vote share than, say, victorious federal parties, and thus should be expected to have more 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Conservatives won 78.5 percent of the seats.   However, that  is actually a standard result  in an Alberta 
provincial election!   This can be seen in Table 1 (column 3), which gives summary data on all federal and 
provincial elections since 1900.  Alberta, Prince Edward Island, and Quebec, in that order, are the three 
jurisdictions where  the mean  seat  share  for  the winning party has been  the highest.    Conversely,  the 
mean seat share for the winning party has been the lowest federally and also in Manitoba — although 
the  mean  seats  shares  here  still  have  been  comfortably  in  majority  territory.    Ontario  and  British 
Columbia  also  have  had  relatively  low  seat  shares  for  their  winning  parties.    The  remaining  four 
provinces are in the middle, with mean seat shares  right around 70 percent.  Table 1 also provides the 

































Canada  31  56.6  2.34  261.5  259.9  44.7  11.9  63.4 
Newfoundland  28  70.9  1.76  41.2  35.4  55.3  15.6  82.9 
PEI  30  76.4  1.55  30.2  16.9  53.4  23.1  95.8 
Nova Scotia  28  69.2  1.82  43.4  36.2  48.8  20.5  78.0 
New Brunswick  26  69.3  1.73  52.4  31.1  51.6  17.7  86.3 
Quebec  29  73.1  1.69  98.4  98.4  50.2  22.9  77.0 
Ontario  30  65.1  2.03  108.2  107.5  46.1  19.0  65.0 
Manitoba  29  56.7  2.39  54.2  51.1  42.6  14.2  61.3 
Saskatchewan  26  70.2  1.81  56.3  54.7  48.5  21.6  68.9 
Alberta  27  79.0  1.58  66.7  63.5  50.6  28.4  56.9 
BC  30  65.3  2.00  53.3  46.2  45.2  20.1  64.7 
 





elections,  followed by Alberta with six and Quebec with five, although every province  is  included here 
except for Ontario and Manitoba.  In Ontario the biggest provincial landslides were the elections of 1951 
and 1955, where the Progressive Conservatives respectively won 87.8 and 85.7 percent of the seats.  In 
Manitoba  the  biggest  provincial  landslide was  the  election  of  1915, which  saw  the  victorious  Liberals 
winning  85.1  percent  of  the  seats.    Again,  though,  federal  elections  still  have  the  “smallest  largest” 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that  is,  the  difference  between  its  seat  share  (1PSC)  and  its  vote  share  (1PVC:  first  party  vote 
concentration), with a positive difference meaning bias  in  its  favour.   All elections with such values of 
30.0 or more are listed, which again means that we are only talking about provincial elections here (the 
highest  federal  SBL  being  25.8  in  1935).    It  should  be  stressed  that  for  all  of  the  elections  listed  in 





















Newfoundland  1932  26  92.3  70.8  28.3  42.5  84.6  42.1 
Newfoundland  2007  48  91.7  69.5  21.1  48.4  85.4  37.0 
Newfoundland  1956  36  88.9  66.3  32.0  34.3  77.8  43.5 
Newfoundland  1949  28  78.6  65.5  32.9  32.6  60.7  28.1 
Newfoundland  1951  28  85.7  63.6  35.6  28.0  71.4  43.4 
Newfoundland  1900  36  88.9  62.9  35.3  27.6  77.8  50.2 
Alberta  1975  75  92.0  62.7  18.2  44.5  86.7  42.2 
Alberta  1982  79  94.9  62.3  18.7  43.6  92.4  48.8 
Alberta  2001  83  89.2  61.9  27.3  34.6  80.7  46.1 
Newfoundland  1966  42  92.9  61.8  34.0  27.8  85.7  57.9 
BC  1949  48  81.3  61.4  35.1  26.3  66.7  40.4 
Newfoundland  1982  52  84.6  61.2  34.9  26.3  69.2  42.9 
Nova Scotia  1925  43  93.0  60.9  36.3  24.6  90.7  66.1 
PEI  1989  32  93.8  60.7  35.8  24.9  87.5  62.6 
Quebec  1916  81  92.6  60.6  35.1  25.5  85.2  59.7 
Newfoundland  1972  42  78.6  60.5  37.2  23.3  57.1  33.8 
New Brunswick  1987  58  100.0  60.4  28.6  31.8  100.0  68.2 
PEI  1912  30  93.3  60.2  39.8  20.4  86.7  66.3 




regression of vote share on seat share of  the winning party  for all provincial elections since 1900,  the 
former explains more than half of the latter.  Yet this is not the only factor at play, as one can see in a 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membership  is  to  be  chosen  by  the  first‐past‐the‐post  system,  elections  to  smaller 







In any case,  the number of seats  is  thus a relevant  independent variable for winning party seat share.  
However,  this may not be  so much a  continuous  independent  variable as one where  there  is  a break 






small”  legislatures  —  with  resulting  strong  disproportionality  —  of  the  Eastern  Caribbean.    These 
national legislatures now range from 15 seats in Saint Kitts and Nevis to 36 seats in Trinidad and Tobago.  










Columbia.   Secondly, deviations from plurality voting have also occurred.    In terms of  federal districts, 
these have always been either single member or dual‐member, but there never were that many of the 
latter.    As Ward  (1967:  125)  notes,  there were  never more  than  ten  of  these  federally, with  the  last 
couple  being  eliminated  in  the  1960s.    Thus  for  federal  elections  the  number  of  constituencies  was 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multi‐member  districts  through  the  1920s,  and  then  a  few  dual‐member  districts  until  the  1970s.  





the postwar era were  frequently manipulated to benefit  the dominant Social Credit party.   As Table 1 
shows,  in  these  provinces  the  average  number  of  constituencies  has  thus  been  clearly  below  the 
average number of seats. 
 
Crucially,  these  aforementioned  elections  (with  a  qualification  for  British  Columbia  below)  were  all 
fought using plurality voting.  In that sense they were similar to single member plurality.  However, there 
have been a couple of other electoral  formulae used at the provincial  level.   The alternative vote (AV) 
was used in rural Manitoba from 1927 through 1953, in rural Alberta from 1926 through 1955, and for 
two but only two elections (those of 1952 and 1953) in British Columbia.  Yet the alternative vote is also 
a majoritarian  formulae,  as  evidenced  by  both  the  1953  British  Columbia  elections  (where  the  Social 
Credit party won a manufactured majority on 37.8 percent of the first preference vote) and by elections 
to  the Australian House of Representatives,  the main  international examples of  this  system.   Thus  for 
these purposes, that of seats won by the largest party, one should not consider the alternative vote to 
be fundamentally different from plurality voting.  What is different is the single transferable vote (STV), 
which  was  used  for  decades  in  Manitoba  (to  elected  the  members  from  Winnipeg)  and  in  Alberta 
(primarily to elect the members from Calgary and Edmonton).   STV  is a proportionate system, and did 




In  summary,  though,  the most  common deviation  from single member plurality  in Canadian elections 
was  not  STV  or  indeed  any  form  of  proportional  representation,  but  dual‐  or multi‐member  districts 
elected by plurality voting.  By having fewer constituencies than seats (and sometimes a lot fewer, as in 









strong party  loyalties  increase the tendency to bloc voting.    It  is almost  inevitable that 
wherever there are strong partisan divisions, split‐ticket voting will become the anomaly 
(frequently  the consequence of error on  the part of  the voter) and the one party  [sic] 
will win all the seats in the district. 
 
To  show  this, Qualter  (ibid.)  uses  the example of  the  three‐member district of  Saskatoon  in  the 1960 
Saskatchewan provincial election.  With 43.4 percent of the total votes, the CCF elected all three of its 
candidates.    In  contrast,  the  second‐place  Liberals  elected  nobody,  even  though  they  received  31.0 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close  —  for  example,  the  election  of  1966  which  saw  17  Liberals  and  15  Progressive  Conservatives 











the main  historical  use  of  this  is  the  data  set  of  Pasis  (1990),  which  has  been  updated  by  Courtney 
(2001).   Unfortunately, however, Pasis’ data set  is  incomplete, especially  for the prewar era.   Thus we 








Yet  electoral  systems  broadly  defined may  not  be  the  direct  causal  issue  here;  perhaps  instead  it  is 





federal  one.    Indeed,  only  in  Newfoundland  (where  most  recently  in  2007  the  winning  Progressive 
Conservatives received 69.5 percent of the vote) and in Prince Edward Island can we say that the typical 
election result is of a dominant vote share by the winning party. Elsewhere lopsidedness thus seems to 
have  more  to  do  with  the  nature  of  the  opposition  vote,  specifically  its  concentration  versus 
fragmentation.    Following  McCormick  (1980),  this  is  measured  in  terms  of  the  share  of  the  total 
opposition vote won by the  largest opposition party, which can be as high as 100 percent  if  there are 
only  two parties  running and  thus only one opposition party.    I  shall  call  this measure  the opposition 
vote concentration. 
 
Lastly,  an  historical  point worth  noting  in  terms  of  party  politics  is  that  six  of  the  (earlier)  provincial 
elections since 1900 have been won by farmers’ parties:  three in Alberta, two in Manitoba (by the UFM 
and then the Progressives), and one in Ontario.  Such parties and their victories differed from others in a 
couple of ways.   First,  these parties clearly  focussed on part of  the province  (the rural part obviously) 
rather than competing all out everywhere.  This thus meant a particularly strong geographic bias in their 
vote.    Second,  this point  combined with  the malapportionment  in  favour of  rural areas  in all of  these 
(interwar)  elections  meant  that  majority  victories  and  seat  bias  could  occur  on  only  very 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small  shares  of  the  total  vote  (at  the  extreme,  22.3  percent  in  Ontario  in  1919,  and  28.9  percent  in 
Alberta  in 1921).   Consequently, we can test a dummy variable for the winning party being a  farmers’ 




whichever other party won  the election.    This we  can  also  test with  a dummy variable  for  a  relevant 
(seat‐winning)  farmers’  party  in  opposition.    Such  outcomes  occurred  at  least  once  in  five  provinces:  
Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan, with this in fact being the outcome 







extremely  strong predictor of  its  seat  share.   This provides a  stronger explanation  than even  the vote 












In  terms  of  party  system  variables,  two  dummy  variables  involved  a  rural‐based  farmers’  party  (or 




a  larger number of cases — and the seat share of  the  largest party  is 11 percent  less  than otherwise.  
Lastly  in  terms  of  bivariate  analysis,  we  can  consider  the  losing  party  or  parties  and  how  their  vote 
patterns affect  the winning party.   Certainly  the smaller  the second party  in  terms of votes,  the more 
seats  for  the  winning  party.    Yet  what  matters  more  in  this  regard  is  the  extent  to  which  the  total 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Table  3  –  Bivariate  Regressions  on  Seat  Concentration  (Seat  Percentage)  of  the  Largest  Party  (All 
Provincial Elections since 1900) 
N=283  unstandardized B  standardized B  t‐score  Sig.  adjusted r2 
vote percentage of the largest 
party 
1.552  0.771  20.289  0.000  0.593 
vote lead over the second 
largest party 
0.873  0.633  13.694  0.000  0.398 
total number of seats  ‐0.072  ‐0.124  ‐2.095  0.037  0.012 
50 seats or less dummy variable  5.126  0.165  2.805  0.005  0.024 
30 seats or less dummy variable  10.790  0.221  3.798  0.000  0.045 
total number of constituencies  ‐0.051  ‐0.105  ‐1.778  0.076  0.008 
50 constituencies or less 
dummy variable 
2.335  0.078  1.306  0.193  0.002 
30 constituencies or less 
dummy variable 
5.356  0.155  2.633  0.009  0.021 
percentage of seats plurality or 
AV voting 
0.371  0.114  1.922  0.056  0.009 
strong malapportionment 
dummy variable 
4.649  0.134  2.268  0.024  0.014 
election won by a farmers' party 
dummy variable 




‐10.860  ‐0.157  ‐2.659  0.008  0.021 
vote percentage of the second 
largest party 
‐0.212  ‐0.127  ‐2.139  0.033  0.013 
share of opposition votes won 
by the largest opposition party 






opposition vote, having  the victorious party be a  farmers’ party,  and not  having a  farmers’ or  fishers’ 
party be in the legislature but not in government.  (The rare fourth factor thus precludes the fifth one.)  
Combined  these  five  factors  explain  seventy percent of  the  variance  in  the  seat  share of  the winning 




of  lopsidedness,  that  is,  the seat bias  in  favour of  the  leading party  (Table 5) and the percentage seat 
lead  of  the  winning  party  over  the  official  opposition  (Table  6).    The  five  variables  remain  highly 
significant in all cases, although the overall model is clearly a weaker fit regarding the seat bias in favour 
of the leading party. 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vote percentage of the largest party  2.007  0.082  24.359  0.000 
30 seats or less dummy variable  5.599  1.699  3.295  0.001 
share of opposition votes won by the  ‐0.306  0.033  ‐9.265  0.000 
  largest opposition party         
election won by a farmers' party  10.613  3.573  2.970  0.003 
  dummy variable         
seat winning but non‐victorious 
farmers' 
‐13.400  2.329  ‐5.754  0.000 
  / fishers' party dummy variable         
constant  ‐6.823  3.521  ‐1.937  0.054 







vote percentage of the largest party  1.007  0.082  12.220  0.000 
30 seats or less dummy variable  5.599  1.699  3.295  0.001 
share of opposition votes won by the 
largest opposition party 
‐0.306  0.033  ‐9.265  0.000 
election won by a farmers' party 
dummy variable 




‐13.400  2.329  ‐5.754  0.000 
constant  ‐6.823  3.521  ‐1.937  0.054 
adjusted r‐squared        0.392 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vote percentage of the largest party  3.554  0.153  23.217  0.000 
30 seats or less dummy variable  12.616  3.158  3.995  0.000 
share of opposition votes won by the 
largest opposition party 
‐0.796  0.061  ‐12.978  0.000 
election won by a farmers' party 
dummy variable 
25.460  6.639  3.835  0.000 
seat winning but non‐vict. farmers'/ 
fishers' party d. variable 
‐18.491  4.327  ‐4.274  0.000 
constant  ‐71.917  6.543  ‐10.991  0.000 
adjusted r‐squared        0.668 
Conclusions: Two Routes to Lopsided Results 
Even  if  relatively  rare  federally,  lopsided  election  results  have  been  a  common  pattern  in  Canadian 
provincial politics, with  consequent problems  in  terms of both disproportionality and  lack of effective 




As shown  in Table 1, Alberta and Prince Edward  Island are also  the top two provinces  in  terms of  the 
mean percentage of seats won by the  largest party  (79.0 and 76.4 percent respectively).   Finally,  they 
are also the top two provinces  in terms of  the mean seat bias  in  favour of  the  largest party  (although 
one should note Quebec as a close third here).  However, Alberta and Prince Edward Island have taken 
clearly different “routes” to their lopsided outcomes.  In the case of Alberta, the key factor has been a 
low opposition vote concentration, that  is,  the definite  lack of a straight contest between the winning 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New Brunswick  1987  58  58  Liberals  58  100.0  1.000  60.4 
PEI  1935  30  15  Liberals  30  100.0  1.000  57.9 
BC  2001  79  79  Liberals  77  97.5  1.026  57.6 
PEI  1993  32  16  Liberals  31  96.9  1.032  55.1 
PEI  2000  27  27  PCs  26  96.3  1.038  57.9 
New Brunswick  1912  48  17  Cons  46  95.8  1.044  59.9 
Alberta  1963  63  63  Social 
Credit 
60  95.2  1.050  54.8 
Alberta  1982  79  79  PCs  75  94.9  1.054  62.3 
Nova Scotia  1901  38  18  Liberals  36  94.7  1.056  56.7 
Alberta  1959  65  65  Social 
Credit 
61  93.8  1.066  55.7 
PEI  1989  32  16  Liberals  30  93.8  1.066  60.7 
Alberta  1979  79  79  PCs  74  93.7  1.067  57.4 
Nova Scotia  1945  30  26  Liberals  28  93.3  1.072  52.7 
PEI  1912  30  15  Cons  28  93.3  1.072  60.2 
Nova Scotia  1925  43  19  Cons  40  93.0  1.075  60.9 
BC  1912  42  34  Cons  39  92.9  1.076  59.7 
Newfoundland  1966  42  41  Liberals  39  92.9  1.076  61.8 
Quebec  1973  110  110  Liberals  102  92.7  1.079  54.7 
Quebec  1916  81  81  Liberals  75  92.6  1.080  60.6 
Newfoundland  1932  26  24  Cons  24  92.3  1.083  70.8 
Alberta  1905  25  25  Liberals  23  92.0  1.087  57.6 
Alberta  1975  75  75  PCs  69  92.0  1.087  62.7 
Newfoundland  2007  48  48  PCs  44  91.7  1.091  69.5 
Quebec  1919  81  81  Liberals  74  91.4  1.094  51.9 
Saskatchewan  1934  55  52  Liberals  50  90.9  1.100  48.0 
Nova Scotia  1963  43  40  PCs  39  90.7  1.103  56.2 
BC  1909  42  34  Cons  38  90.5  1.105  52.3 
Quebec  1900  74  74  Liberals  67  90.5  1.105  53.1 
Quebec  1904  74  74  Liberals  67  90.5  1.105  55.5 
New Brunswick  1948  52  17  Liberals  47  90.4  1.106  57.8 
Saskatchewan  1944  52  49  CCF  47  90.4  1.106  53.1 
PEI  1939  30  15  Liberals  27  90.0  1.111  53.0 
PEI  1955  30  15  Liberals  27  90.0  1.111  55.0 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 election  Total seats  Total const  1PSC  Inverse (E∞PP)  1PVC  SBL 
Saskatchewan  1934  55  52  90.9  1.100  48.0  42.9 
PEI  1935  30  15  100.0  1.000  57.9  42.1 
PEI  1993  32  16  96.9  1.032  55.1  41.8 
Nova Scotia  1945  30  26  93.3  1.072  52.7  40.6 
Alberta  1963  63  63  95.2  1.050  54.8  40.4 
Alberta  1967  65  65  84.6  1.182  44.6  40.0 
BC  2001  79  79  97.5  1.026  57.6  39.9 
New Brunswick  1987  58  58  100.0  1.000  60.4  39.6 
Quebec  1919  81  81  91.4  1.094  51.9  39.5 
Ontario  1951  90  90  87.8  1.139  48.5  39.3 
PEI  2000  27  27  96.3  1.038  57.9  38.4 
BC  1909  42  34  90.5  1.105  52.3  38.2 
Alberta  1959  65  65  93.8  1.066  55.7  38.1 
Nova Scotia  1901  38  18  94.7  1.056  56.7  38.0 
Quebec  1973  110  110  92.7  1.079  54.7  38.0 
Quebec  1948  92  92  89.1  1.122  51.2  37.9 
Alberta  1944  57  49  89.5  1.117  51.9  37.6 
Quebec  1900  74  74  90.5  1.105  53.1  37.4 
Saskatchewan  1944  52  49  90.4  1.106  53.1  37.3 
Ontario  1955  98  98  85.7  1.167  48.5  37.2 
PEI  1939  30  15  90.0  1.111  53.0  37.0 
Alberta  1979  79  79  93.7  1.067  57.4  36.3 
New Brunswick  1912  48  17  95.8  1.044  59.9  35.9 
New Brunswick  1995  55  55  87.3  1.145  51.6  35.7 
PEI  1955  30  15  90.0  1.111  55.0  35.0 
Quebec  1904  74  74  90.5  1.105  55.5  35.0 
Alberta  1935  63  53  88.9  1.125  54.2  34.7 
Nova Scotia  1963  43  40  90.7  1.103  56.2  34.5 
Alberta  1905  25  25  92.0  1.087  57.6  34.4 
Nova Scotia  1967  46  43  87.0  1.149  52.8  34.2 
Alberta  2008  83  83  86.7  1.153  52.7  34.0 
Alberta  1948  57  49  89.5  1.117  55.6  33.9 
Alberta  1921  61  52  62.3  1.605  28.9  33.4 
BC  1912  42  34  92.9  1.076  59.7  33.2 
PEI  1912  30  15  93.3  1.072  60.2  33.1 
PEI  1989  32  16  93.8  1.066  60.7  33.1 
Quebec  1931  90  90  87.8  1.139  54.9  32.9 
Alberta  1982  79  79  94.9  1.054  62.3  32.6 
New Brunswick  1948  52  17  90.4  1.106  57.8  32.6 
Saskatchewan  1991  66  66  83.3  1.200  51.0  32.3 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New Brunswick  1991  58  58  79.3  1.261  47.1  32.2 
Nova Scotia  1925  43  19  93.0  1.075  60.9  32.1 
Quebec  1916  81  81  92.6  1.080  60.6  32.0 
Saskatchewan  1982  64  64  85.9  1.164  54.1  31.8 
Newfoundland  1966  42  41  92.9  1.076  61.8  31.1 
Nova Scotia  1906  38  18  84.2  1.188  53.2  31.0 
PEI  1923  30  15  83.3  1.200  52.3  31.0 
PEI  2003  27  27  85.2  1.174  54.3  30.9 
Alberta  1926  61  52  70.5  1.418  39.7  30.8 
BC  1933  47  39  72.3  1.383  41.7  30.6 
Nova Scotia  1937  30  26  83.3  1.200  52.9  30.4 
Nova Scotia  1984  52  52  80.8  1.238  50.6  30.2 
Manitoba  1915  47  44  85.1  1.175  55.1  30.0 



















PEI  1935  30  15  100.0  0.0  100.0  15.8 
New Brunswick  1987  58  58  100.0  0.0  100.0  31.8 
BC  2001  79  79  97.5  2.5  94.9  36.0 
PEI  1993  32  16  96.9  3.1  93.8  15.6 
PEI  2000  27  27  96.3  3.7  92.6  24.2 
Alberta  1982  79  79  94.9  2.6  92.4  43.6 
Alberta  1959  65  65  93.8  1.6  92.3  31.8 
Alberta  1963  63  63  95.2  3.2  92.1  34.8 
New Brunswick  1912  48  17  95.8  4.2  91.7  20.7 
Nova Scotia  1925  43  19  93.0  2.3  90.7  24.6 
British Columbia  1912  42  34  92.9  2.3  90.5  48.6 
Nova Scotia  1901  38  18  94.7  5.3  89.5  15.0 
Alberta  1979  79  79  93.7  5.0  88.6  37.5 
PEI  1989  32  16  93.8  6.2  87.5  24.9 
Quebec  1973  110  110  92.7  5.5  87.3  24.5 
PEI  1912  30  15  93.3  6.7  86.7  20.4 
Nova Scotia  1945  30  26  93.3  6.7  86.7  39.1 
Alberta  1975  75  75  92.0  5.3  86.7  44.5 
Alberta  1948  57  49  89.5  3.5  86.0  36.5 
Alberta  1944  57  49  89.5  3.5  86.0  27.0 
Newfoundland  1966  42  41  92.9  7.1  85.7  27.8 
British Columbia  1909  42  34  90.5  4.7  85.7  19.1 
Newfoundland  2007  48  48  91.7  6.3  85.4  48.4 
Quebec  1916  81  81  92.6  7.4  85.2  25.5 
Quebec  1919  81  81  91.4  6.1  85.2  34.9 
Newfoundland  1932  26  24  92.3  7.7  84.6  42.5 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Alberta  1905  25  25  92.0  8.0  84.0  20.5 
Alberta  1909  41  39  87.8  4.9  82.9  27.6 
Saskatchewan  1934  55  52  90.9  9.1  81.8  24.0 
Nova Scotia  1963  43  40  90.7  9.3  81.4  16.5 
Quebec  1904  74  74  90.5  9.5  81.1  28.8 
Quebec  1900  74  74  90.5  9.5  81.1  11.2 
Alberta  1935  63  53  88.9  7.9  81.0  31.1 
Saskatchewan  1944  52  49  90.4  9.6  80.8  17.7 
New Brunswick  1948  52  17  90.4  9.6  80.8  26.6 
Alberta  2001  83  83  89.2  8.4  80.7  34.6 
Quebec  1948  92  92  89.1  8.7  80.4  15.0 
PEI  1939  30  15  90.0  10.0  80.0  6.0 
PEI  1955  30  15  90.0  10.0  80.0  10.0 
New Brunswick  1935  48  17  89.6  10.4  79.2  19.4 
Ontario  1951  90  90  87.8  8.9  78.9  17.0 
Alberta  1952  61  50  85.2  6.6  78.7  33.8 
Newfoundland  1959  36  35  86.1  8.3  77.8  32.7 
Newfoundland  1900  36  18  88.9  11.1  77.8  27.6 
Newfoundland  1956  36  35  88.9  11.1  77.8  34.3 
Quebec  1927  85  85  87.1  10.5  76.5  25.0 
New Brunswick  1995  55  55  87.3  10.9  76.4  20.7 
Alberta  2008  83  83  86.7  10.8  75.9  26.3 
Quebec  1931  90  90  87.8  12.2  75.6  11.4 
Alberta  1967  65  65  84.6  9.2  75.4  18.6 
Saskatchewan  1917  59  59  86.4  11.9  74.6  20.4 
Manitoba  1915  47  44  85.1  10.6  74.5  22.1 
Ontario  1955  98  98  85.7  11.2  74.5  15.2 
Nova Scotia  1967  46  43  87.0  13.0  73.9  11.0 
Saskatchewan  1982  64  64  85.9  14.1  71.9  16.5 
Saskatchewan  1912  53  53  84.9  13.2  71.7  15.0 
Saskatchewan  1925  63  60  81.0  9.5  71.4  29.6 
Newfoundland  1951  28  25  85.7  14.3  71.4  28.0 
Nova Scotia  1906  38  18  84.2  13.2  71.1  11.1 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